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Abstract We explore the use of the Mantin biases (Mantin, Eurocrypt 2005) to recover
plaintexts fromRC4-encrypted traffic.Weprovide amorefine-grained analysis of these biases
than in Mantin’s original work. We show that, in fact, the original analysis was incorrect in
certain cases: the Mantin biases are sometimes non-existent, and sometimes stronger than
originally predicted.We then show how to use these biases in a plaintext recovery attack. Our
attack targets two unknown bytes of plaintext that are located close to sequences of known
plaintext bytes, a situation that arises in practice when RC4 is used in, for example, TLS. We
provide a statistical framework that enables us to make predictions about the performance of
this attack and its variants. We then extend the attack using standard dynamic programming
techniques to tackle the problem of recovering longer plaintexts, a setting of practical interest
in recovering HTTP session cookies and user passwords that are protected by RC4 in TLS.
We perform experiments showing that we can successfully recover 16-byte plaintexts with
80% success rate using 231 ciphertexts, an improvement over previous attacks.
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1 Introduction
RC4 is a very widely-deployed stream cipher, but its usage in particular applications such
as TLS and WPA/TKIP has recently come under heavy attack – see [1,4,5,7–9], and the
concurrent work to ours, [12]. The main idea of these attacks is to exploit known and newly
discovered biases in RC4 keystreams to recover fixed plaintexts that are repeatedly encrypted
under RC4. Such attacks can be realised against applications using RC4, including TLS and
WPA/TKIP, and in particular lead to serious breaks in application layer protocols using TLS.
Mantin [6] showed that patterns of the form ABSAB occur in RC4 keystreamswith higher
probability than expected for a random sequence. Here A and B are byte values and S is an
arbitrary byte string of some length G. Mantin’s main result can be stated as follows. Let
G ≥ 0 be a small integer and let Zr denote the r -th output byte produced by RC4. Under the
assumption that the RC4 state is a random permutation at step r , then







Note that for a truly random byte string Zr , . . . , Zr+G+3, the probability that (Zr , Zr+1) =
(Zr+G+2, Zr+G+3) is equal to 2−16. The relative bias is therefore equal to e(−4−8G)/256/256,
which is about 1/256 for small G.
Mantin’s biases are particularly attractive for use in attacks on RC4 because they are
a) relatively large, b) numerous, and c) persistent in RC4 keystreams. Their presence was
confirmed experimentally in [6,10]. Indeed, they have already been exploited in attacks –
see [7] and the concurrent work to ours, [12]. In the current paper, we make a systematic
study of their use in attacking RC4 in the broadcast setting. Our main contributions can be
summarised as follows:
1. We provide a more fine-grained analysis of theMantin biases than in the original analysis
[6], showing that in fact for certain values of A and B, the biases are non-existent, or, in
some cases, stronger than predicted by (1). For example, we show that if A = 1 or B = 1,
then the analysis in [6] fails, and so there is no reason to expect any bias for strings of the
form 1BS1B or A1SA1. We also conducted large-scale experiments to confirm that our
new analysis is correct. These results are important given the way in which the Mantin
biases are used to attack RC4, for two reasons. Firstly, significant deviations from the
expected bias behaviour would reduce the effectiveness of the attacks. Secondly, if the
biases depended significantly on the values of A, B and G, and this dependence was
well-understood, then it could be exploited in refined attacks on RC4 (this phenomenon
was exploited in [8,9] for RC4 as deployed in WPA/TKIP, though for different biases).
2. Fortunately, as we will see, the number of byte pairs (A, B) for which Mantin’s analysis
is incorrect is small, and the average behaviour is still in-line with (1). This makes it
profitable to develop a statistical framework for exploiting the Mantin biases in plaintext
recovery attacks for the broadcast setting. We provide such a framework which directly
leads to an algorithm that recovers adjacent pairs of unknown plaintext bytes, under the
assumption (also used in [7,12] and valid in practice for attacks against protocols like
TLS) that the target plaintext bytes are in the neighbourhood of known plaintext bytes.
3. Importantly, and in contrast with [7,12], our analysis enables us to make predictions
about the numbers of ciphertexts needed to reliably recover target plaintext bytes. More
precisely, our attack computes the likelihood of each possible target plaintext byte pair,
and we are able to compute the distribution of the rank of the likelihood of the correct
byte pair amongst the likelihoods of all possible pairs as a function of the number of
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ciphertexts N and the number of known plaintext bytes T . In particular, we can compute
the values of (N , T ) needed to ensure that the median value of the rank is 1, meaning
that the correct plaintext is recovered with high probability. Our approach here is to use
results from order statistics, a well-established field of statistical investigation that does
not appear to have been applied extensively before in cryptanalysis.
4. Our framework extends smoothly to make predictions in practically interesting cases
where, for example, some side information is known about the plaintexts, or where
known plaintext bytes are present on either side of the unknown bytes.
5. We also extend the algorithm targeting just two unknown plaintext bytes to the situation
where the target is a longer sequence of unknown plaintext bytes. This is a situation of
practical interest in attacking session cookies [1] and passwords [4] that are protected by
RC4 in TLS. We formally justify using as a likelihood estimate for a longer sequence of
plaintext bytes the sum of the logs of the likelihoods of the overlapping pairs of adjacent
bytes comprising that longer sequence. As a consequence of our summation formula
for likelihoods, we are able to make use of standard methods from the literature, namely
beam search and the list Viterbi algorithm [11], to find longer plaintext candidates having
high likelihoods. The beam search algorithm ismemory-efficient but does not provide any
guarantees about the quality of its outputs; the list Viterbi algorithm is memory-intensive,
but is guaranteed to output a list of candidates having the L highest likelihoods, where
L is a parameter of the algorithm. In practical attacks involving cookies and passwords,
this type of guarantee is sufficient, since large numbers of candidates can be tested for
correctness.
6. We report on a range of experiments with the beam search and list Viterbi algorithms,
evaluating their performance for different parameters. For example, using L = 216 in the
list Viterbi algorithm, N = 231 ciphertexts, and 130 known plaintext bytes split either
side of a 16-byte unknown plaintext, we are able to recover that 16-byte target plaintext
with a success rate of about 80%. This is a significant improvement on the preferred
attack of [1], which required around 233 – 234 ciphertexts, and is broadly comparable
with the results obtained in [12].
1.1 Further remarks on related work
AlFardan et al. [1] presented two attacks against RC4 in TLS, using single-byte biases in the
first and double-byte Fluhrer–McGrew biases from [3] in the second. As in our work, their
second attack uses a Viterbi algorithm (though only outputting a single plaintext candidate,
so not a list Viterbi algorithm). Their second attack requires around 234 ciphertexts to reliably
recover a 16-byte target plaintext. Isobe et al. [5] also gave plaintext recovery attacks for RC4
using single-byte and double-byte biases, though their attacks were less effective than those
of [1] and they did not explore in detail the applicability of the attacks to TLS.
Ohigashi et al. [7] were the first to use the Mantin biases in plaintext recovery attacks
against RC4. They present an attack that targets a single unknown plaintext byte and that
uses multiple Mantin biases (for different values of G). Roughly speaking, the unknown
plaintext byte is aligned with the second “B” in patterns of the form ABSAB for varying
sizes of S, while the plaintext bytes in the other 3 positions are known; a count is made of the
number of times in the RC4 output a string ABSAB is suggested for each unknown plaintext
byte. In the analysis of [7], all biases are “weighted” in the same way, while, intuitively,
the weaker the bias, the less reliable the information about plaintext bytes it provides. This
overweights the known plaintext bytes that are far from the unknown, target bytes, and leads
to a statistically sub-optimal attack. Their attack also recovers multiple plaintext bytes in a
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byte-by-byte fashion,meaning that if the attack goeswrong, then it tends to continuewrongly.
This in turn means that the success rate of the attack decreases exponentially with the target
plaintext length. Ohigashi et al. did not provide any rigorous analysis of their attacks, but
instead simulated them to estimate their effectiveness.
In concurrent work to ours, Vanhoef and Piessens [12] conducted an extensive search for
new biases in RC4 keystreams, and settled on using theMantin biases in combinationwith the
Fluhrer–McGrew biases to target the recovery of HTTP session cookies from TLS sessions.
(They also presented an attack on WPA/TKIP that is based heavily on the single-byte bias
attacks from [8,9].) Like us, they use a likelihood-based analysis involving Mantin biases,
but their analysis is only formalised for single values of G, and they simply take the products
of likelihoods for different values of G without further formal statistical justification (though
this procedure can be rigorously justified, as our work here shows). They also include in their
product a likelihood term arising from the Fluhrer–McGrewbiases. Given the ad hoc nature of
their approach, they resort to (convincing) verification of attack performance via simulations.
By contrast, we are able to provide an analytical approach which makes predictions about
the distribution of the rank of our likelihood statistic for the correct plaintext bytes. Vanhoef
and Piessens [12] extend their attacks to the recovery of multiple plaintext bytes using a list
Viterbi algorithm, though without giving a formal justification as we do. They are able to
obtain results for impressive values of L , the list size, in this algorithm. For example, their
headline result is obtained using L = 223 and recovers a 16-byte plaintext with 94% success
rate using N = 9 ·227 ciphertexts and roughly 256 known plaintext bytes on either side of the
unknown bytes. However, it should be noted that this result applies for a restricted plaintext
alphabet, which, as our analysis shows, can significantly boost the performance of attacks.
1.2 Paper organisation
In Sect. 2 we provide further background on the RC4 stream cipher. In Sect. 3, we present
our refined analysis of the Mantin biases. Section 4 presents our attacks targeting adjacent
pairs of unknown plaintext bytes along with their analysis using order statistics. In Sect. 5,
we extend the likelihood analysis developed for pairs of unknown bytes to multiple unknown
bytes, and report on our extensive experiments for this setting. Section 6 contains conclusions
and open problems (Fig. 1).
2 Background
2.1 The RC4 algorithm
RC4 allows for variable-length key sizes, anywhere from 40 to 256 bits, and consists of
two algorithms, namely, a key scheduling algorithm (KSA) and a pseudo-random generation
algorithm (PRGA). The KSA takes as input an l-byte key and produces the initial internal
state st0 = (i, j, S) for the PRGA; S is the canonical representation of a permutation of the
numbers from 0 to 255 where the permutation is a function of the l-byte key, and i and j
are indices for S. The KSA is specified in Algorithm 1 where K represents the l-byte key
array and S the 256-byte state array. Given the internal state str , the PRGA will generate a
keystream byte Zr+1 as specified in Algorithm 2.
For an overview of how RC4 is used in TLS, see [1,4]. The salient points for our analysis
are as follows: in each TLS connection, RC4 is keyed with a 128-bit key that is effectively
uniformly random; the key is used throughout the lifetime of a TLS connection.
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Fig. 1 Algorithms implementing the RC4 stream cipher. All additions are performed modulo 256
Table 1 Fluhrer–McGrew biases
for consecutive pairs of byte
values
(Zr , Zr+1) Condition on i = r mod 256 Probability
(0, 0) i = 1 2−16(1 + 2−7)
(0, 0) i = 1, 255 2−16(1 + 2−8)
(0, 1) i = 0, 1 2−16(1 + 2−8)
(i + 1, 255) i = 254 2−16(1 + 2−8)
(255, i + 1) i = 1, 254 2−16(1 + 2−8)
(255, i + 2) i = 0, 253, 254, 255 2−16(1 + 2−8)
(255, 0) i = 254 2−16(1 + 2−8)
(255, 1) i = 255 2−16(1 + 2−8)
(255, 2) i = 0, 1 2−16(1 + 2−8)
(129, 129) i = 2 2−16(1 + 2−8)
(255, 255) i = 254 2−16(1 − 2−8)
(0, i + 1) i = 0, 255 2−16(1 − 2−8)
Here, i is the value of the internal
variable of the RC4 keystream
generation algorithm at the point
when the first symbol of the pair
is output; i is implemented as an
8-bit counter with wrap-around,
and i = r mod 256 when the
output bytes Zr of RC4 are
numbered starting from 1
2.2 Known RC4 biases
We recall the main results on biases in RC4 outputs from [3] and [6] that are relevant here.
The following is the main result of [3]:
Result 1 Let Zr be the r-th output byte of RC4 given a random key (of any length), where the
outputs are numbered starting from 1. Then, for sufficiently large r and for specific values,
the adjacent byte pairs (Zr , Zr+1) are non-uniformly distributed as shown in Table 1.
Extensive computations in [1] confirmed the presence of these biases and also did not
reveal any other significant biases in adjacent byte pairs. Further, the biases are present from
position 256 onwards.
The following result is a restatement of Theorem 1 of Mantin [6], concerning the prob-
ability of occurrence of byte strings of the form ABSAB in RC4 outputs, where A and B
represent bytes and S denotes an arbitrary byte string of a particular length G.
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Result 2 Let G ≥ 0 be a small integer. Under the assumption that the RC4 state is a random
permutation at step r , then







The approximate correctness of the above result was experimentally confirmed in [6] for
values of G up to 64 and for long keystreams. Further confirmation for the same range of G
and for relatively short keystreams was provided in [10].
3 A fine-grained analysis of the Mantin biases
The Mantin biases, as presented in Result 2, concern the probability of occurrence of byte
strings of the form ABSAB in RC4 outputs. The probabilities do not depend on the specific
values of A and B, but are instead averaged over these values, and depend only on the lengthG
of stringS. Herewe providemore fine-grained results about the statistics of patterns ABSAB
in RC4 outputs for specific values of A and B (and in some cases, G). We then verify
these through experiment with large numbers of RC4 outputs. All previous experimental
confirmations of which we are aware only studied the dependence of the bias on G and so
did not observe the phenomena that we catalogue below.
Our notation is the same as in [6] and in Sect. 2. Specifically, S denotes the RC4 permuta-
tion, and i and j are the algorithm’s internal indices. We use Sr to denote array S at the end
of round r . Similarly we use ir and jr to denote the values of i and j at the end of round r .
Also, when studying a pattern ABSAB in the RC4 output, G will denote the length of the
string S.
3.1 Mantin’s analysis
In [6], Mantin explains that the pattern ABSAB is more likely to arise in RC4 output than in
an unbiased random byte stream because of a particular scenario that produces this type of
pattern and whose probability is higher than expected. The scenario is as follows: for a given
round r , let g denote jr−1 − ir−1; now suppose the following three conditions are satisfied:
(1) Sr−1[ir ] = 1;
(2) jr+g−1 = ir−1;
(3) i and j avoid the values ir−1, ir , ir+g−1 and ir+g from round r + 1 to round r + g − 2,
as well as value Sr−1[ir−1] + Sr−1[ jr−1] from round r to round r + g − 1, and value
Sr [ir ] + Sr [ jr ] from round r + 1 to round r + g.
Then it can be shown that the bytes output by RC4 at rounds r + g − 1 and r + g are equal
to the bytes output at rounds r − 1 and r , respectively. That is, a pattern ABSAB arises in
the RC4 output, with S of length G = g− 2. Mantin then goes on to evaluate the probability
that these conditions hold, and, with some approximations, finally arrives at the expression
in the statement of Result 2.
We now analyse this argument from [6] for special values of A, B and g. For each case, we
will use conditions (1) and (2) to show that condition (3) cannot hold. This in turn implies
that, for the special values of A, B and g, there is no reason to expect strings ABSAB to
occur with the biased probabilities predicted by Mantin.
123
Analysing and exploiting the Mantin biases in RC4
Case A = 1: Since A is the output during round r − 1, we know that
Sr−1[Sr−1[ir−1] + Sr−1[ jr−1]] = 1.
Moreover, because of condition (1) above, we have Sr−1[ir ] = 1. But Sr−1 is a permutation,
which implies that Sr−1[ir−1] + Sr−1[ jr−1] = ir . But this is in contradiction with condition
(3), since it forbids the equality ik = Sr−1[ir−1] + Sr−1[ jr−1] for r  k  r + g − 1.
Case B = 1: This case is similar to the previous one. Assuming that B = 1, we get
Sr [Sr [ir ] + Sr [ jr ]] = 1. Condition (1) gives Sr−1[ir ] = 1, so by the definition of RC4 (in
particular, since it swaps S[i] and S[ j] in each round), we have Sr [ jr ] = 1. As before, Sr is a
permutation, and so its injectivity implies Sr [ir ]+ Sr [ jr ] = jr . However, since Sr−1[ir ] = 1,
we know that jr = jr−1 + 1. Then, since g = jr−1 − ir−1, we obtain jr = g + ir−1 + 1.
Finally, since i increments on each round, we get jr = ir+g , which provides the relation
Sr [ir ] + Sr [ jr ] = ir+g , giving a contradiction with condition (3).
Case A = 253 and g = 2: We assume now that A = 253 and g = 2 (i.e. jr−1 = ir−1 + 2).
Since Sr−1[ir ] = 1 (from condition (1)), we get jr = jr−1 + 1 = ir−1 + 3. Condition
(2) becomes jr+1 = ir−1. From the behaviour of the RC4 algorithm (namely jr+1 = jr +
Sr [ir+1]), we obtain Sr [ir+1] = 253. Finally, since ir = ir+1 − 1 and jr = ir+1 + 1, the
value of S in entry ir+1 is not affected by round r , and so Sr−1[ir+1] = Sr [ir+1] = 253.
On the other hand, Sr−1[Sr−1[ir−1] + Sr−1[ jr−1]] = 253, because A = 253. By combining
these results, and noting that Sr−1 is a permutation, we get Sr−1[ir−1] + Sr−1[ jr−1] = ir+1
which invalidates condition (3).
Case B = 253 and g = 2: Because g = 2, as in the previous case, we know that Sr [ir+1] =
253. The hypothesis B = 253 is equivalent to writing Sr [Sr [ir ] + Sr [ jr ]] = 253. Then
Sr [ir ] + Sr [ jr ] = ir+1, and condition (3) is contradicted again.
Note that the last two cases above concern patterns of the form ABAB for specific values
of A and B (G = 0), while the first two cases apply concern patterns with A = 0 or B = 0
for any value of G ≥ 0. Between them, the 4 cases account for roughly 1/128 of all possible
patterns ABSAB.
3.2 The Mantin bias when A = B
We now focus on refining Mantin’s estimate for biases in distributions for strings of the form
AASAA (i.e. when A=B). We will assume here that A = 1 and B = 1, since those cases
were already treated above.
When A = B, we have that Sr−1[ir−1] + Sr−1[ jr−1] = Sr [ir ] + Sr [ jr ]. This is because
these two values are the indices in S that are used for producing outputs A and B in rounds
r − 1 and r , respectively, and because, by assumption, the elements in these indices are not
moved during these rounds. Thus Mantin’s condition (3), which states that i and j must not
collide with these two values across certain rounds (amongst other things) is more likely to
hold since the two values are equal. Specifically, the term (1 − g256 )2 · e−2g/256 in Mantin’s
proof of [6, Lemma 2] can be replaced with a term (1 − g256 ) · e−g/256; when 1 − g256 is
approximated by e−g/256 as is the case throughout Mantin’s analysis, we finally arrive at the
following:
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Theorem 1 Let G ≥ 0 be a small integer. Under the assumption that the RC4 state is a
random permutation at step r , then







Notice here how the exponent (−4 − 6G)/256 replaces the usual exponent of (−4 −
8G)/256 appearing in Mantin’s bias, leading to larger biases in the special case A = B.
Note too that this special case concerns roughly 1/256 of all possible patterns ABSAB.
3.3 Double-byte bias correction
As shown in Table 1, some pairs of bytes aremore likely to occur inRC4 outputs for particular
values of i . Some pairs are especially lucky because the bias exists for almost every value
of i . This leads to additional biases in patterns of the form ABSAB that are not accounted
for by Mantin’s analysis. In fact, the resulting biases are at least twice as big as Mantin’s for
G = 0 and do not decrease with G; so for G = 64, they are ten times the size!
Case A = 0 and B = 0: According to Table 1, the pair of bytes (0, 0) occurs with prob-
ability 2−16(1 + 2−8), instead of 2−16, for all but two values of i . Hence, based on the
Fluhrer–McGrew biases alone, and assuming that occurrences of these biases are pair-wise
independent, we would expect the pattern 00S00 (for any size of S) to occur with probability
2−32(1+2−8)2 ≈ 2−32(1+2−7). Assuming that the generation mechanism for the Fluhrer–
McGrew biases is independent of that for the Mantin biases, the occurrence probabilities can
simply be summed, and we might then expect to see 00S00 in RC4 outputs with probability
2−32
(
1 + 2−8e(−4−6G)/256 + 2−7).
Case A = 0 and B = 1: Here the analysis is as in the previous case, except that, since
B = 1, we do not expect to find any Mantin bias at all. Then, for any size of S, the pattern
01S01 can be expected to be output with probability 2−32 (1 + 2−7).
Case A = 255 and B = 255: In this case, Table 1 indicates that the byte pair (255, 255)
occurs with probability 2−16(1 − 2−8) for all but one value of i , that is, we have a negative
bias in the majority of positions. However A = B, so the analysis in Sect. 3.2 applies for
the Mantin bias. Following the same reasoning as before, the occurrence probability for this
case is therefore expected to be 2−32
(
1 + 2−8e(−4−6G)/256 − 2−7).
Note that between them, the above 3 cases concern only a small proportion (3 out of 216)
of all possible patterns of the form ABSAB.
3.4 Experimental validation
We have conducted experiments to confirm the above theoretical observations.
We computed the distributions of patterns of the form ABSAB for values (A, B,G) with
A, B ranging over the possible byte values and for G with 0 ≤ G ≤ 64. We used 238 RC4
keystreams with random 128-bit keys, each keystream containing 212 bytes, for a total of 250
keystream bytes; this computation required 72 core-days of computation on our local server
(Intel Xeon cores running at 3.3Ghz, 256 GB RAM).
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Fig. 2 Observed biases for strings of the form ABAB (G = 0) in RC4 outputs for random 128-bit keys for
different values of A (x-axis) and B (y-axis). For each position we encode the bias in the keystream for the
string ABAB as a colour. The colouring scheme encodes the difference between the observed probabilities
and the (expected) probability 1/232, scaled up by a factor of 232 (Color figure online)
Our experimental results are illustrated in Figs. 2 and 3,which show the biaseswe observed
as a function of byte values A and B, for G = 0 (g = 2) and aggregated overG, respectively.
Note that these plots are predominately red, which aligns with the prediction of Mantin’s
analysis that all strings ABSAB have a positive bias.
The data in Fig. 2 is somewhat noisy, but it is possible to see the absence of biases
for A = 1, B = 1, A = 253 and B = 253. However, when A = B, we do not see
the positive bias behaviour predicted by Theorem 1, but instead a small, negative bias. We
do not currently have an explanation for this behaviour. Coming now to Fig. 3, showing
aggregated behaviour, the absence of biases for A = 1, B = 1 and the strong positive bias
for A = B are clear. It is less easy to see the deviations from Mantin’s predictions arising
from the double-byte bias corrections for (A, B) = (0, 0), (0, 1), (255, 255), but they are
present. Averaging over G, we empirically observed probabilities that were consistent with
the theoretical values computed in Sect. 3.3: for (A, B) = (0, 0), the empirical probability
was 2−32(1 + 0.01005), for (A, B) = (1, 1), it was 2−32(1 + 0.00834) and for (A, B) =
(255, 255), it was 2−32(1 − 0.00574).
Aside from the special case of A = B and G = 0, we did not observe any additional
significant deviations from the behaviour predicted by Result 2 and our refinements of that
result. However, a larger-scale computation might well reveal further fine structure. For
example, as suggested by a reviewer, it is possible that there is a dependence of biases on i .
Since i is known to the attacker, if such biases were present and of significant size, then this
would result in exploitable behaviour.
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Fig. 3 Observed biases for strings of the form ABSAB in RC4 outputs for random 128-bit keys and averaged
over 0 ≤ G ≤ 64 for different values of A (x-axis) and B (y-axis). For each position we encode the bias in
the keystream for the string ABSAB as a colour. The colouring scheme encodes the difference between the
observed probabilities and the (expected) probability 1/232, scaled up by a factor of 232 (Color figure online)
4 A plaintext recovery attack based on Mantin biases and its performance
Whilst we have observed that the distribution of patterns of the form ABSAB in RC4
outputs does not conform exactlywithMantin’s analysis [6], the deviations from the predicted
behaviour are small, in the sense of affecting the probabilities of only a small proportion of
the possible patterns. This means that, when theMantin biases are used in statistical plaintext
recovery attacks, it is reasonable to assume that the behaviour is as predicted by Result 2.
We do so henceforth, and present a plaintext recovery attack that exploits the Mantin
biases. The attack is derived by first posing the plaintext recovery problem as one of maxi-
mum likelihood estimation. This enables us to also provide a concise analysis of the expected
number of ciphertexts required to successfully recover the correct plaintext (and, more gen-
erally, to rank the correct plaintext within the top R candidates, for some chosen value of
R).
We operate in the broadcast setting, so the same plaintext is assumed to be encrypted
many times under different RC4 keystream segments, in known positions. We target the
recovery of two unknown, consecutive plaintext bytes that are adjacent to a group of known
plaintext bytes. These attack assumptions (partially known plaintext, broadcast setting) are
fully realistic whenmounting attacks that target HTTP cookies in protocols such as TLS-RC4
(see [1] for further details).
In the next section, we explain how to extend our attack targeting two consecutive plaintext
bytes so as to recover longer strings of bytes.
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4.1 Maximum likelihood estimation
Weconsider the problemof plaintext recovery for various situations arising fromRC4 encryp-
tion as a maximum likelihood problem.
4.1.1 Notational setup
The following setup applies throughout this section, unless otherwise noted. Suppose
p1, . . . , pT , PT+1, PT+2 are T + 2 successive plaintext bytes which are to be encrypted
a number of times under RC4 using a number of different keystreams. We suppose that the
first T plaintext bytes p1, . . . , pT are known plaintext bytes, but that the next two plain-
text bytes PT+1, PT+2 are unknown and we wish to determine them. (Throughout we use
lower-case letters for known quantities, and upper-case for unknown quantities, which can
be regarded as random variables.)
We let ci,1, . . . , ci,T , ci,T+1, ci,T+2 denote the T + 2 successive known ciphertext bytes
obtained by encrypting the plaintext bytes p1, . . . , pT , PT+1, PT+2 using the i th RC4
keystream zi,1, . . . , zi,T , Zi,T+1, Zi,T+2. Thus we have that
zi,1 = p1 ⊕ ci,1, . . . , zi,T = pT ⊕ ci,T are known keystream bytes
and
Zi,T+1 = PT+1 ⊕ ci,T+1, , Zi,T+2 = PT+2 ⊕ ci,T+2 are unknown keystream bytes.
Now the Mantin bias can be expressed in the following way. We first define a positive
decreasing sequence δ0, δ1, . . . , δT−2 by
δG = e(−4−8G/256)/256 = 2−8e− 164 e− G32 [G = 0, 1, . . . , T − 2].
Then, from Result 2, we have:
P
(
(Zi,T+1, Zi,T+2) = (zi,T−G−1, zi,T−G)
) ≈ 2−16(1 + δG).
By contrast, for byte pairs (a1, a2) not in the i th RC4 keystream we have
P
(
(Zi,T+1, Zi,T+2) = (a1, a2)
) ≈ 2−16 [(a1, a2) = (zi,1, zi,2), . . . (zi,T−1, zi,T )].
4.1.2 A likelihood function
We now calculate the probability mass function for θ = (PT+1, PT+2) for the i th encryption
based on the above probabilities. This will lead us to a likelihood function for θ .
By a straightforward calculation, we have:
P
(
(PT+1, PT+2) = (p′, p′′)
) = P ((Zi,T+1, Zi,T+2) = (p′ ⊕ ci,T+1, p′′ ⊕ ci,T+2)) .
This probability is therefore different from 2−16 if, for some G, there exists a keystream byte
pair (zi,T−G−1, zi,T−G) such that
(p′ ⊕ ci,T+1, p′′ ⊕ ci,T+2) = (Zi,T+1, Zi,T+2) = (zi,T−G−1, zi,T−G)
= (pT−G−1 ⊕ ci,T−G−1, pT−G ⊕ ci,T−G),
that is to say if
(p′, p′′) = (pT−G−1 ⊕ ci,T−G−1 ⊕ ci,T+1, pT−G ⊕ ci,T−G ⊕ ci,T+2).
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We now let xi,G denote the known 2-byte quantity
(pT−G−1 ⊕ ci,T−G−1 ⊕ ci,T+1, pT−G ⊕ ci,T−G ⊕ ci,T+2)
for the i th RC4 encryption, and we let xi = (xi,0, . . . , xi,T−2)T denote the vector of such
known 2-byte quantities. If we then let θ denote the value of the unknown plaintext bytes
(PT+1, PT+2), then the probability mass function of xi given the parameter θ is
f (xi ; θ) ≈
{
2−16(1 + δG) xi,G = θ [G = 0, . . . , T − 2]
2−16 otherwise.
This means that the likelihood function of the parameter θ = (PT+1, PT+2) given the
data xi is given by
L(θ; xi ) ≈
{
2−16(1 + δG) θ = xi,G [G = 0, . . . , T − 2]
2−16 otherwise.
Here the approximations arise from the fact that, for a given i , the equality θ = xi,G could
hold for multiple values of G, while our analysis ignores this eventuality (which is of low
probability).
We now consider the likelihood function of the parameter θ = (PT+1, PT+2) given N
such data vectors x1, . . . , xN derived from known plaintext-ciphertext bytes. If we let
SG(θ; x) = #{xi,G = θ | i = 1, . . . , N }
be a count of the number of times the G th component of x1, . . . , xN is equal to θ , then the
joint likelihood function satisfies
L(θ; x1, . . . , xN ) ≈ 2−16N
T−2∏
G=0
(1 + δG)SG (θ;x).
Thus if we let x denote the data x1, . . . , xN , then the log-likelihood function is given by
L(θ; x) = log L(θ; x) = −16N log 2 +
T−2∑
G=0
SG(θ; x) log(1 + δG)




≈ δT S(θ; x) − 16N log 2,
where δ = (δ0, . . . , δT−2)T and S(θ; x) = (S0(θ; x), . . . , ST−2(θ; x))T . Thus the value of
θ which maximises
δT S(θ; x) ≈ L(θ; x) + 16N log 2
is essentially the maximum likelihood estimate θ̂ of the plaintext parameter θ =
(PT+1, PT+2) given the known data x .
4.2 Plaintext recovery attack
The preceding analysis leads immediately to an attack recovering the two unknown bytes
θ = (PT+1, PT+2) given access to N ciphertexts: for each value of θ , compute δT S(θ; x)
and output the value of θ which maximises this expression.
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The attack can be implemented efficiently by processing the i-th ciphertext as it becomes
available, using it to compute the quantities xi,G and updating a (T −1)×216 array of integer
counters by incrementing the array in positions (G, xi,G) for each G between 0 and T − 2.
Once all N ciphertexts are processed in this way, the array contains the counts SG(θ; x) from
which the log likelihood of each candidate θ can be computed by taking inner products with
the vector δ.
Note too that, since the attack produces log likelihood estimates for each of the 216
candidates θ , it is trivially adapted to output a ranked list of plaintext candidates in order of
descending likelihood. This feature is important for our extended attacks in the following
section.
This basic attack can be extended in several different ways (some of which can be con-
sidered in combination):
1. To the situation where the unknown plaintext bytes are not contiguous with the known
plaintext bytes. This merely requires adjusting the above analysis to use Mantin biases
for the correct values of G (rather than starting from G = 0). Note that because the
Mantin biases decrease in strength with increasing G, the attack will be rendered less
effective.
2. To the case where known plaintext bytes are located on both sides of the unknown
plaintext bytes (possibly in a non-contiguous fashion on one or both sides). Again, this
only requires the above analysis to be adjusted to use the correct set of values for G.
Using more biases in this way results in a stronger attack.
3. To the case where one of two target plaintext bytes, PT+1 say, is already known. This is
easily done by considering only the log likelihoods of a reduced set of candidates θ in
the attack.
4. To the situation where the plaintext space is constrained in some way, for example, where
the bytes of θ are known to beASCII characters or where base64 encoding is used. Again,
this can be done by working with a reduced set of candidates θ .
4.3 Distribution of the maximum likelihood statistic and attack performance
We now proceed to evaluate the effectiveness of the above basic attack, as a function of the
number of available ciphertexts, N , and the number of known plaintext bytes, T .
We let θ∗ denote the true value of the plaintext parameter θ . The component SG(θ; x) has
a binomial distribution, and there are two cases depending on whether or not θ is this true
value θ∗, so we have
SG(θ∗; x) ∼ Bin(N , 2−16(1 + δG))
and SG(θ; x) ∼ Bin(N , 2−16) [θ = θ∗].
If we write μ = N2−16, then E(SG(θ∗; x)) = 2−16N (1 + δG) = μ(1 + δG) and
E(SG(θ; x)) = 2−16N = μ for θ = θ∗, with Var(SG(θ; x)) ≈ 2−16N = μ for all θ
(to a very good approximation). For the values of N and hence μ = 2−16N of interest to us,
these binomial random variables are very well-approximated by normal random variables,
and we essentially have
SG(θ∗; x) ∼ N(μ(1 + δG), μ)
and SG(θ; x) ∼ N(μ,μ) [θ = θ∗].
Thus the vector S(θ∗; x) = (S0(θ∗; x), . . . , ST−1(θ∗; x))T corresponding to the true param-
eter θ∗ and the vectors S(θ; x) = (S0(θ; x), . . . , ST−1(θ; x))T (for θ = θ∗) corresponding
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to other values of the plaintext parameter have a multivariate normal distribution. Further-
more, it is reasonable to assume that the components of these vectors are independent, so we
have
S(θ∗; x) ∼ NT−1(μ(1 + δ), μIT−1)
and S(θ; x) ∼ NT−1(μ1, μIT−1) [θ = θ∗].
The maximum likelihood statistic is essentially determined by the distributions of
δT S(θ∗; x) and δT S(θ; x) (for θ = θ∗). However, these are just rank-1 linear mappings
of multivariate normal random variables and so have univariate normal distributions given
by
δT S(θ∗; x) ∼ N(μ(δT 1 + |δ|2), μ|δ|2)
and δT S(θ; x) ∼ N(μδT 1, μ|δ|2) [θ = θ∗].
The above distributions suggest that it is convenient to consider the function
J (θ; x) = δ








− μ 12 |δ|− 12 (1T δ)
on the parameter space. It is clear that J (θ; x) is a very good approximation to an affine
transformation of the log-likelihood function, so the value of θ which maximises J (θ; x) is
essentially the maximum likelihood estimate θ̂ of the plaintext parameter θ = (PT+1, PT+2)
given the known data x .
We note that J (θ; x) has a univariate normal distribution with unit variance in both cases
as we have






and J (θ; x) ∼ N (0, 1) for θ = θ∗.
Furthermore, we may essentially regard all of these random variables J (θ; x) as independent
since the random variables Sg(θ; x) are very close to being independent.
The function J (θ; x) can be thought of as a “variance-stabilised” form of log-likelihood
function L(θ; x) of the plaintext parameter θ . Furthermore, the squared length of the vector












This means, for instance, that |δ| ≈ 0.00385 for T = 2 and |δ| ≈ 0.00930 for T = 8, with
|δ| ≈ 0.0156 for large T .
4.3.1 Performance of plaintext ranking in the basic attack
With the above reformulation, finding the maximum likelihood estimate θ̂ by maximising
the function J (θ; x) can now be seen as essentially comparing a realisation of a normal
N(μ
1
2 |δ|, 1) random variable (corresponding to J (θ∗; x)) with a set R = {J (θ; x)|θ = θ∗}
of realisations of 216 − 1 = 65535 independent standard normal N(0, 1) random variables.
Thus the maximum likelihood estimate θ̂ gives the true plaintext parameter θ∗ if a realisation
of an N(μ
1
2 |δ|, 1) random variable exceeds the maximum of the realisations of 216 − 1
independent standard normal random variables.
This enables the probability that the maximum likelihood estimate is correct (and the
basic attack succeeds) to be evaluated as a function of N and T (where, recall, N denotes the
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Fig. 4 Cumulative distribution function of the rankRk(θ∗) for different numbers of ciphertexts, N (T = 26).
The x-axis is a dimensionless number representing rank; the y-axis shows the probability that Rk(θ∗) ≤ x
(Color figure online)
number of available ciphertexts and T denotes the number of known, consecutive plaintext
bytes that are immediately followed by an unknown pair of bytes). However, we are able
to go further and consider the rank of the correct plaintext θ∗ in the ordered list of values
J (θ; x) (from highest to lowest) as a function of N and T , that is to evaluate the performance
of the ranking version of the plaintext recovery attack. Such an evaluation makes use of the
following result concerning order statistics [2].
Result 3 Suppose X1, . . . , Xk are independent standard normal N(0, 1) random variables
and that Φ denotes the distribution function of a standard normal N(0, 1) random variable.
ThenΦ(X1), . . . , Φ(Xk) are independentUni(0, 1) randomvariables and the order statistics





k + 1 .
It follows that Φ(z) is an accurate representation on a linear uniform scale between 0 and
1 of the position of a value z within X(1), . . . , X(k). Thus the random variable giving the
position (from highest to lowest) or “rank” of J (θ∗; x) within the set R, and hence the rank
of θ∗, is given accurately by rounding the random variable
Rk(θ∗) = 216(1 − Φ(J (θ∗; x)))
to the nearest integer.
The distribution function FRk(θ∗) of this (unrounded) rank Rk(θ
∗) of θ∗ is given by
FRk(θ∗)(z) = P (Rk(θ∗) ≤ z) = P
(
216(1 − Φ(J (θ∗; x))) ≤ z)
= P (J (θ∗; x) ≥ Φ−1 (1 − 2−16z)) = 1 − F∗ (Φ−1 (1 − 2−16z)) ,







Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution function of the rank Rk(θ∗) for different
numbers of ciphertexts, N , for the specific value T = 26. It can be seen that as N approaches
232, it becomes highly likely that the rank of θ∗ is rather small. On the other hand, when
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Table 2 Median rank of maximum likelihood estimate of plaintext parameter
N 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237
T = 21 28,236 26,390 23,838 20,387 15,920 10,628 5353 1596 174 3 1
T = 23 22,081 18,078 13,105 7664 3024 566 25 1 1 1 1
T = 26 15,735 10,423 5176 1502 155 2 1 1 1 1 1
N drops below 228, the attack does not have much advantage over random guessing (which
would produce a diagonal line on the cumulative distribution plot).
The median of Rk(θ∗), which is very close to the mean of Rk(θ∗), is the value of z
satisfying FRk(θ∗)(z) = 12 , that is to say






Table 2 shows some median rankings for the value of J (θ∗; x) within the set of all such
216 = 65536 values of J (θ; x). A median rank of “1” indicates that the maximum likelihood
estimate θ̂ gives the true plaintext parameter θ∗ with high probability.
4.3.2 Performance of plaintext ranking in variant attacks
The above analysis is easily extended to evaluate the performance of the variant attacks
described in Sect. 4.2.
For variant 1, in which the unknown plaintext bytes are not contiguous with the known
plaintext bytes, we need only replace the value of |δ| with the appropriate value computed
from the biases actually used in the attack. For variant 2, where known plaintext bytes are
located on both sides of the unknownplaintext bytes, the same is true, but this time δ increases;
the analysis is otherwise identical. For example, |δ|2 doubles when we use an additional T







distribution with μ = 2−16N , it can be seen that the effect of doubling
|δ|2 by using “double-sided” biases in this way is the same as that of doubling N in the
attack; put another way, using double-sided biases reduces the number of ciphertexts needed
to obtain a given median ranking for the value of J (θ∗; x) by a factor of 2.
Variants 3 and 4 both concern the case where the plaintext space for the pair (PT , PT+1) is
reduced from a set of 216 candidates to some smaller set of candidates, C say. For example, in
variant 3, where one of the plaintext bytes is known, |C| = 28. This means that our fundamen-
tal statistical problem becomes one of distinguishing a realisation of a normal N(μ
1
2 |δ|, 1)
randomvariable (corresponding to J (θ∗; x)) fromanowsmaller setR = {J (θ; x)|θ ∈ C\θ∗}
of |C|−1 realisations of independent standard normalN(0, 1) randomvariables. Our previous





) = |C| · Φ (−2−8N 12 |δ|) .
123
Analysing and exploiting the Mantin biases in RC4
The effect of this is to divide all the entries in Table 2 by 216/|C|. For example, in variant 3
where |C| = 28, we would expect a median rank of roughly 6 with N = 230 ciphertexts and
T = 26.
Note that these two effects are cumulative. For example, using double-sided biases and
assuming one byte of plaintext from the pair (PT+1, PT+2) is known has the effect of both
reducing N by a factor of 2 and dividing the median rank by 28. Then, for example, with
only N = 229 ciphertexts and T = 26 we would expect J (θ∗; x) to have a median rank of
about 6, meaning that the correct plaintext θ∗ can be expected to have a high ranking.
4.3.3 Experimental validation
We carried out an experimental validation of our statistical analysis, performing experiments
with T = 26 for different numbers of ciphertexts, N , and computing the cumulative dis-
tribution function of the rank Rk(θ∗). The results are shown in Fig. 5 for N = 228, 229
and 230. Good agreement can be seen between the experimental results and the predictions
made by our statistical analysis, with the experiments slightly outperforming the theoretical
predictions in each case.
4.4 Incorporating prior information about plaintext bytes
Prior information about the unknown plaintext bytes is frequently available and can be
exploited (see, for example, [4]) to improve attacks.
Prior information in our setting can be incorporated using the inferential form of Bayes
Theorem, which can be loosely expressed as
Posterior ∝ Likelihood × Prior,
or equivalently in its logarithmic form as
Log-Posterior = Log-Likelihood + Log-Prior + Constant.
If we let π(θ) denote the prior probability of the plaintext parameter θ = (PT+1, PT+2) and
π(θ; x) the posterior probability of the parameter θ given the data x , then we have
logπ(θ; x) = L(θ; x) + logπ(θ) + Constant
≈ δT S(θ; x) + logπ(θ) + Constant.
This suggests that for purposes such as posterior plaintext ranking, we consider an adaptation
of J (θ; x) given by
Jπ (θ; x) = δ









We note that Jπ (θ; x) has a univariate normal distribution with unit variance as we have



















for θ = θ∗.
It is clear that when N or equivalently μ = 2−16N is small, that is roughly speaking
when μ|δ|2 << |logπ(θ)|, the mean value of the posterior scoring function is given by
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Fig. 5 Cumulative distribution function of the rankRk(θ∗) for different numbers of ciphertexts, N (T = 26):
N = 228 (top), N = 229 (middle), N = 230 (bottom). In each case, the x-axis is a dimensionless number
representing rank and the y-axis shows the probability that Rk(θ∗) ≤ x
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E (Jπ (θ; x)) ≈ μ− 12 |δ|−1 logπ(θ) for both θ = θ∗ and θ = θ∗. Thus when N or μ is small,
the posterior scoring function essentially orders the plaintext parameters π according to the
prior distribution π ; analysis of the available ciphertexts does not yield enough evidence
to “overturn” the evidence given by the prior distribution. By contrast when N or μ is
large, that is roughly speaking when μ|δ|2 >> |logπ(θ)|, then E (Jπ (θ∗; x)) ≈ μ 12 δ and
E (Jπ (θ; x)) ≈ 0 for θ = θ∗. In this situation, the evidence of the experiment “overwhelms”
the evidence given by the prior distribution, and we are essentially considering the previous
scenario.
The interesting situation is therefore whenμ|δ|2 and |logπ(θ)| are of roughly comparable
size. We consider howmuch data is needed to “overturn” an ordering of plaintext parameters
according to their prior probabilities. In this situation, the scoring function for the plaintext












for θ = θ∗.
Thus the scoring function for the correct plaintext parameter θ∗ is expected to exceed that of











The interesting case is obviously when π(θ) > π(θ∗), that is to say when θ is a priori a more
likely plaintext parameter than θ∗. In this case, the above expression indicates how many
samples are likely to be required to be able to place an a posteriori rank θ∗ above that for θ .
Clearly, the answer depends on the specifics of the distribution π .
5 Attacks recovering multiple plaintext bytes
We now extend the preceding attacks and analysis to consider the situation where the target
plaintext extends over multiple bytes. As in previous [1,4,5,7–9] and concurrent [12] works,
this is important in building practical attacks targeting HTTP cookies, passwords, etc. We are
particularly interested in attack algorithms that output lists of candidates rather than single
candidates, since in many practical situations, many suggested candidates can be tried one
after another, as was first suggested in [1].
This problemwas already addressed in [1] and [7] for attacks exploiting Fluhrer–McGrew
and Mantin biases, respectively. Although not explicit in [1], the algorithm used there is
a Viterbi algorithm and is guaranteed to output the best plaintext candidate on W bytes
according to an approximate log likelihoodmetric; roughly 233 – 234 ciphertexts were needed
to recover a 16-byte plaintext with high success rate. The algorithm in [7] proceeds on a byte-
by-byte basis and the success probability of it recovering the correct plaintext is the product
of success rates for single bytes. This, unfortunately, means that the success rate drops rapidly
as a function of the byte-length of the target plaintext. For example, with N = 232 ciphertexts
and T = 66 known plaintext bytes, the algorithm of [7] achieves a success rate of 0.7656 for
a single byte, but this would be reduced to (0.7656)16 = 0.014 for 16 bytes.
Throughout this section, we let W denote the byte-length of the target plaintext, and L
the size of the list of plaintext candidates output by our plaintext recovery algorithms. An
algorithm is declared successful if the target plaintext is to be found in the output list.
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5.1 A likelihood analysis for multiple plaintext bytes
As previously, we assume plaintext bytes p1, . . . , pT are known. Our task now is to recover
the W unknown bytes θ = (PT+1, . . . , PT+W ). We let θw denote (PT+w, PT+w+1) for
1 ≤ w ≤ W − 1. Using the methods of Sect. 4, we can form W − 1 ranked lists of values
for L(θw; x), where as before x denotes the collection of N data vectors x1, . . . , xN derived
from known plaintext-ciphertext bytes. Note here that when w ≥ 2, these log-likelihoods
will be computed using progressively weaker Mantin biases with G ≥ 1.




of log-likelihoods for the byte pairs θi .
This replacement is formally justified as follows. Consider the probabilitymass function of
a data vector xi given the unknown byte pairs θ = (θ1, . . . , θW−1). This can be approximated
as
f (xi ; θ1, . . . , θW−1) ≈
{
2−16(1 + δG+w−1) xi,G = θw
2−16 otherwise.
Here, the nature of the approximation is similar to that made in our analysis in Sect. 4: it
assumes that at most one low probability event xi,G = θw occurs for each i .
However, the probability mass function of a data vector xi given a single unknown byte
pair θw can be approximated as
f (xi ; θw) ≈
{
2−16(1 + δG+w−1) xi,G = θw
2−16 otherwise,
so the product of all such probability mass functions can be approximated as
W−1∏
w=1
f (xi ; θw) ≈
{
2−16(W−2) 2−16(1 + δG+w−1) xi,G = θw
2−16(W−2) 2−16 otherwise.
This enables us to give an approximate proportionality relationship between the the proba-
bility mass function of a data vector xi given the unknown byte pairs θ = (θ1, . . . , θW−1)
and the probability mass functions of a data vector xi given single unknown byte pairs θw
since we now see that
f (xi ; θ1, . . . , θW−1) ∝
W−1∏
w=1
f (xi ; θw).
This can be re-formulated in terms of likelihood functions as




The likelihood function of the byte pairs θ = (θ1, . . . , θW−1) given all the data vectors x =
(x1, . . . , xN ) is therefore proportional (to a good approximation) to a product of individual
likelihood functions, that is to say
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which can be expressed in log-likelihood terms (for some constant C) as




Thus maximising the overall log-likelihood L(θ; x) can be achieved (to a good approxima-
tion) by maximising the sum
∑W−1
w=1 L(θw; x) of individual log-likelihoods.
5.2 Algorithms for recovering multiple plaintext bytes
It follows from the above analysis that, to find high log-likelihood candidates for θ , we need
to find sequences of overlapping byte pairs θw for which the sums in (2) are large, given the
W − 1 lists L(θw; x). This is a classic problem in dynamic programming that can be solved
by a number of different approaches. We consider two such standard approaches:
5.2.1 List Viterbi
The (parallel) list Viterbi algorithm is described in detail in [11] and generalises the usual
Viterbi algorithm. In its general form it finds the L lowest cost state sequences through a
complete trellis of some width W on some state space, given an initial state and a final
state and where each state transition in the trellis has an associated cost. The algorithm is
easily adapted to the problem at hand by setting the edge weights to be the log-likelihood
values L(θw; x) and interpreting the states as byte values.1 Unfortunately, the algorithm is
relatively memory intensive and slow, requiring roughly 256 · W times as much storage as
the beam search algorithm to return a final list of L candidates.2 However, the algorithm has
the advantage that it guarantees to return the L best plaintext candidates on W bytes, that is
the top L candidates according to the metric represented by (2). The same algorithm appears
to have been used in [12].
5.2.2 Beam search
In the beam search algorithm,we generate a list of L candidates on j positions T +1, . . . , T +
j , each candidate being accompanied by a partial sum
∑ j−1
w=1 L(θw; x). We then expand the
list to include all 256 · L candidates that are 1-byte extensions of candidates on the list,
computing a new sum
∑ j
w=1 L(θw; x) for each candidate by adding a term L(θw; x). We
then prune the list back to L candidates again, by keeping just the top L candidates, but nowon
w + 1 positions. The process is initialised using the top L values for L(θ1; x) on the first two
unknown plaintext bytes. The process is finalised when w = W − 1, and the list need not be
pruned at the final step, though we do so in our implementation to provide a fair comparison
with the list Viterbi algorithm. So the algorithm is deemed successful if the correct plaintext
1 Several additional notational and conceptual changes are needed compared to the original description in [11].
In particular, the initialisation process described in [11] contains a small error, and we wish to maximise rather
than minimise the cost of state sequences. The basic algorithm also requires the first and last bytes of plaintext,
PT+1 and PT+W to be known.
2 A low memory version of the algorithm is also given in [11] but we did not implement it.
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(PT+1, . . . , PT+W ) appears on the final pruned list of L candidates. In a further enhancement,
we may assume the first and last byte of the plaintext are known, and force the candidate
plaintexts to begin and end with those known bytes. The beam search algorithm is fast and
memory-efficient, but does not provide any guarantees about the quality of its outputs (that
is to say, we do not know if it will successfully include the highest log-likelihood plaintext
on its output list).
Note that both algorithms extend smoothly to the double-sided case where some plaintext
bytes are known on both sides of the W unknown bytes; the only modification is to the
computation of the log likelihoods L(θw; x) that are input to the algorithms. Again we will
be forced to use Mantin biases starting with non-zero values of G in computing the values
L(θw; x), because of the presence of a run of unknown plaintext bytes before reaching the
known plaintext bytes. Both algorithms also generalise easily to the case where the plaintext
space is constrained in someway, simply by considering only restricted sets of plaintext bytes
when extending candidates (in beam search) or traversing the trellis (in the list Viterbi case).
5.3 Simulations
5.3.1 Methodology
We performed experiments with the beam search and list Viterbi algorithms, for a variety of
attack parameters. We focus on recovering 16 unknown plaintext bytes, a length typical of
HTTP cookies, and on attacks using single-sided and double-sided biases with, respectively,
T = 66 and 130 known plaintext bytes – in the case of List Viterbi, we require a trellis
of width 18 as the first and last plaintext bytes need to be known, and for beam search
we assume known plaintext bytes, one on either side of the 16 unknown target plaintext
bytes. We are most interested in how the attack performance varies with N , the number
of available ciphertexts, and L , the pruned list size/output list size in the two algorithms.
Further experiments to explore how performance changes with T and W , and for the case
of a constrained plaintext space, would be of interest, but we did not have the computing
resources available to perform these. Notably, target plaintexts such as cookies often have
symbols coming from a much reduced plaintext space, a fact exploited in [12] to reduce their
attack’s ciphertext requirements.
Our experiments ran in two phases: in phase 1, we generated 212 groups, each group
containing N = 227 blocks of keystream bytes. On the fly, for each group, we com-
puted and stored the single-sided and double-sided log-likelihood measures L(θw; x) for
each of the 216 possible values of θw for each of 17 overlapping pairs of positions, yield-
ing log-likelihood information for 18 consecutive unknown plaintext bytes. Then, in phase
2, we collated the measures coming from different groups to create measures for groups
corresponding to progressively larger sets of blocks. This enabled us to carry out 128
plaintext recovery attacks on up to N = 232 ciphertexts each, using our beam search
and list-Viterbi algorithms. We ran each of these algorithms with L = 216 and com-
puted the success rate across different values of N (typical values of N are n · 227 where
n ∈ {8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 24, 28, 32}). The properties of the list Viterbi algo-
rithm made it easy to extract results for L < 216 too.
All computations were performed on the Google Compute Engine (GCE), and we opti-
mised various parameters internal to our code for this platform. Each list Viterbi execution
with L = 216 on a trellis of width 18 took around 2 hours on a single GCE core; by contrast,
the execution of the beam search algorithm completed in a only a couple of minutes for
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Fig. 6 Success rate of list Viterbi algorithm in recovering a 16-byte unknown plaintext for different numbers
of ciphertexts, N and different list sizes L , using double-sided biases, and 130 known plaintext bytes. The
x-axis shows number of ciphertexts divided by 227
the same parameter L . This favourable running time inspired us to conduct further beam
search experiments for higher values of L . For L = 217 each beam search experiment took
about 20 minutes, and for L = 218, the running time was roughly 2.5 hours per experiment.
We attribute this unfortunate scaling in the running time to an increasing number of cache
misses as L grows. In total for the experiments we used around 6200 GCE core-hours of
computation.
5.3.2 Results
We present our results for the attack simulations starting with those for the list Viterbi
algorithm. We then discuss a number of results for the beam search algorithm and conclude
this section with a comparison of the two algorithms.
List Viterbi Figure 6 shows how the success rate varies with N , the number of ciphertexts
available, for the list Viterbi algorithm with double-sided biases (130 known plaintext bytes
split either side of 16 unknown bytes, with 2 of the known bytes being used in the list
Viterbi algorithm and the remaining 128 being used for computing log likelihoods). Each
curve represents a different value of L . It can be seen that, for fixed N , the success rate
increases steadilywith L and that a threshold phenomenon is observable,where above roughly
230 ciphertexts, the success rate takes off rapidly. For example, with N = 231 we see a
success rate 86% for L = 216. We are confident that the success rate would continue to
improve with increasing L and with a larger number of known plaintext bytes, bringing our
results into contention with those of [12] (which used 256 known bytes instead of our 130,
the significantly larger L = 223 in the list Viterbi algorithm, and an undisclosed reduced
plaintext space to achieve a success rate of 94% for recovering a 16-byte plaintext with 9 ·227
ciphertexts, a little over 230 ciphertexts).
Figure 7 compares the performance of the single-sided and double-sided version of the
attacks. Not surprisingly, the use of double-sided biases significantly improves the attack
performance.
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Fig. 7 Success rate of list Viterbi algorithm in recovering a 16-byte unknown plaintext for different numbers of
ciphertexts, using single-sided and double-sided biases (with 66 and 130 known plaintext bytes, respectively)
and L = 216. The x-axis shows number of ciphertexts divided by 227
Fig. 8 Success rate of beam search algorithm in recovering a 16-byte unknown plaintext for different numbers
of ciphertexts, N , and different sizes of L , using double-sided biases and 130 known plaintext bytes. The x-axis
shows number of ciphertexts divided by 227
Beam search We note that unless otherwise stated, we use the enhancement of assuming the
bytes directly adjacent to the 16 target plaintext bytes to be known, andwe force our respective
18-byte candidates to start and end with these bytes. Figure 8 shows the performance of the
beam search algorithm for varying numbers of ciphertexts, N , and for L = 216, 217 and
218. As expected, we do see an improvement in success rates as L grows. For example, with
N = 231 we see a success rate increase of 3% in going from L = 216 to L = 218. Significant
gains, however, are likely to be made with larger values of L , say L = 220.
In order to determine the extent to which assuming adjacent bytes to be known improves
attack performance, we ran the following two sets of experiments: We assumed the first
byte adjacent to the 16 target plaintext bytes to be known and used the single-sided biases
to recover 17-byte candidates (in other words, W = 17 with PT+1 known). We then used
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Fig. 9 Success rate of beam search algorithm in recovering a 17-byte plaintext (first byte known) using single
sided-biases with 65 known plaintext bytes compared to recovering a 16-byte unknown plaintext using single-
sided biases with 64 known plaintext bytes, for different numbers of ciphertexts, N , and for L = 216. The
x-axis shows number of ciphertexts divided by 227
Fig. 10 Success rate of beam search algorithm without final list pruning compared to use of final list pruning
in recovering a 16-byte unknown plaintext for different numbers of ciphertexts, N , using double-sided biases
and 130 known plaintext bytes, and for L = 216. The x-axis shows number of ciphertexts divided by 227
the single-sided biases to recover 16 unknown target bytes (W = 16 and PT+1 unknown).3
Figure 9 shows that there is a small advantage to using this enhancement. For instance, with
N = 232 we see the success rate increase by 3%.
In a further enhancement, we did not prune the list of plaintext candidates in the final
stage of the beam search algorithm. In other words, we retained 28 · L candidates in the
last step of the process and declared success if the correct plaintext appeared on this larger
list of candidates. Figure 10 shows the performance of the beam search algorithm using this
3 Using the generated double-sided biases with W = 18 for the recovery of 16-byte plaintexts would have
resulted in us not being able to use some of the strongest biases for plaintext recovery; targeting bytes PT+2
to PT+17 would mean not using biases when G = 0, and targeting bytes PT+1 to PT+16 would mean not
using biases for each G between 0 and 2 in the recovery of PT+15 and PT+16.
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Fig. 11 Success rate of list Viterbi algorithm compared to beam search algorithm in recovering a 16-byte
unknown plaintext for different numbers of ciphertexts, N , using double-sided biases, L = 216, and 130
known plaintext bytes. The x-axis shows number of ciphertexts divided by 227
enhancement in comparison to the case in which this enhancement is not used. We see a very
slight improvement in attack performance as a result of this enhancement.
Comparing list Viterbi and beam search Figure 11 compares the performance of list Viterbi
and beam search algorithms with L set to 216 in both cases. It can be seen that the beam
search algorithm performs very well, close to the optimal attack that is represented by list
Viterbi. It may make for an attractive alternative in practice, especially for such large values
of L where the memory consumption of the list Viterbi algorithm becomes prohibitive.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have thoroughly analysed the Mantin biases in the outputs of the RC4
algorithm and their exploitation in plaintext recovery attacks. We showed, perhaps surpris-
ingly, that some aspects of Mantin’s original analysis were incorrect. Our work provides an
improved understanding of the genesis of theMantin biases.We developed a statistical frame-
work enabling us to make accurate predictions about the performance of plaintext recovery
attacks targeting adjacent pairs of plaintext bytes. A particular novelty is the introduction of
order statistics, enabling the expected rank of the true plaintext amongst all possible candi-
dates to be computed. We extended the attacks to the situation of multiple unknown plaintext
bytes, and provided an experimental evaluation of two different attacks for this setting, using
the list Viterbi algorithm and beam search, respectively.
Several open problems are suggested by our work. It would be valuable to extend our
analysis of the performance of plaintext ranking from the 2-byte setting to the multi-byte
setting to yield predictive power in the latter setting, something that is currently missing from
our and all other analyses. For example, it would be desirable to have a closed-formexpression
for the expected rank of the true plaintext candidate amongst all possible candidates as a
function of the attack parameters N ,T , andW , andof the size of the plaintext space; thiswould
enable accurate setting of the parameter L (list size) when targeting a particular success rate in
a real attack. It would also be interesting and useful to find a means of rigorously integrating
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the Fluhrer–McGrew biases and the Mantin biases in a single statistical framework, cf. the
ad hoc approach in [12].
Finally, it would be beneficial to experiment further with our proposedmulti-byte plaintext
recovery algorithms. Our two-byte analysis suggests that significant gains can be expected in
particular in the case of a reduced plaintext space, for example for base64 or ASCII-encoded
plaintexts. These are common in session cookies and passwords, respectively. Another direc-
tionwould be to integrate the use ofMantin biaseswith suitable plaintext languagemodels, for
example simple Markov models, in an effort to further improve the performance of plaintext
recovery attacks.
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